Adaptive security is a strong security notion that captures additional security threats that are not addressed by static corruptions. For instance, it captures scenarios in which the attacker chooses which party to corrupt based on the protocol communication. It further captures real-world scenarios where "hackers" actively break into computers, possibly while they are executing secure protocols. Studying this setting is interesting from both theoretical and practical points of view. The former is because the theoretical understanding of this setting is not yet profound and important questions are still unresolved; a notable example is the question regarding the feasibility of constant round adaptively secure protocols. From practical viewpoint, generic adaptively secure protocols are far more complicated and less efficient than static protocols.
Introduction
Secure Two-Party Computation. In the setting of secure two-party computation, two parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some function of their inputs while preserving certain security properties like privacy, correctness and more. In this setting, security is formalized by viewing a protocol execution as if the computation is executed in an ideal setting where the parties send inputs to a trusted party that performs the computation and returns its result (also known by simulation-based security). Starting with the work of [Yao82, GMW87] , it is by now well known that (in various settings) any polynomial-time function can be compiled into a secure function evaluation protocol with practical complexity; see [BDOZ11, LP12, DPSZ12, NNOB12] for a few recent works. The security proofs of these constructions assume that a party is statically corrupted. Meaning, corruptions take place at the outset of the protocol execution and the identities of the corrupted parties are fixed throughout the computation. Adaptive security is a stronger notion where corruptions takes place at any point during the course of the protocol execution. That is, upon corruption the adversary sees the internal data of the corrupted party which includes its input, randomness and the incoming messages. This notion is much stronger than static security due to the fact that the adversary may choose at any point which party to corrupt, even after the protocol is completed! It therefore models more accurately real world threats.
Typically, when dealing with adaptive corruptions we distinguish between corruptions with erasures and without erasures. In the former case honest parties are trusted to erase data if are instructed to do so by the protocol, whereas in the later case no such assumption is made. This assumption is often problematic since it relies on the willingness of the honest parties to carry out this instruction without the ability to verify its execution. In settings where the parties are distrustful it may not be a good idea to base security on such an assumption. In addition, it is generally unrealistic to trust parties to fully erase data since this may depend on the operating system. Nevertheless, assuming that there are no erasures comes with a price since the complexity of adaptively secure protocols without erasures is much higher than the analogue complexity of protocols that rely on erasures. In this paper we do not rely on erasures.
Security against Adaptive Corruptions. It is known by now that security against adaptive attacks captures important real-world concerns that are not addressed by static corruptions. For instance, such attacks capture scenarios where "hackers" actively break into computers, possibly while they are running secure protocols, or when the adversary learns from the communication which parties are worth to corrupt more than others. This later issue can be demonstrated by the following example. Consider a protocol where some party (denoted by the dealer) shares a secret among a public set of √ n parties, picked at random from a larger set of n parties. This scheme is insecure in the adaptive model if the adversary corrupts √ n parties since it can always corrupt the particular set of parties that share the secret. In the static setting the adversary corrupts the exact same set of parties that share the secret with a negligible probability in n.
Other difficulties also arise when proving security. Consider the following protocol for transferring a message: A receiver picks a public key and sends it to a sender that uses it to encrypt its message. Then, security in the static model is simple and relies on the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme. However, this protocol is insecure in the adaptive model since standard semantically secure encryption binds the receiver to a single message (meaning, given the public key, a ciphertext can only be decrypted into a single value). Thus, upon corrupting the receiver at the end of the protocol execution it would not be possible to "explain" the simulated ciphertext with respect to the real message. This implies that adaptive security is much harder to achieve.
Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation. In the two-party setting there are scenarios where the system is comprised from two devices communicating between themselves without being part of a bigger system. For instance, consider a scenario where two devices share an access to an encrypted database that contains highly sensitive data (like passwords). Moreover, the devices communicate via secure computation but do not communicate with other devices due to high risk of breaking into the database. Thus, attacking one of the devices does not disclose any useful information about the content of the database, while attacking both devices is a much harder task. It is reasonable to assume that the devices are not necessarily statically corrupted since they are protected by other means, while attackers may constantly try to break into these devices (even while running secure computation).
In 2011, RSA secureID authentication products were breached by hackers that leveraged the stolen information from RSA in order to attack the U.S. defence contractor Lockheed Martin. The attackers targeted SecurID data as part of a broader scheme to steal defense secrets and related intellectual property. Distributing the SecureID secret keys between two devices potentially enables to defend against such an attack since in order to access these keys the attackers need to adaptively corrupt both devices, which is less likely to occur. Many other applications face similar threats when attempt to securely protect their databases.
We therefore suggest to focus on a security notion that seems the most appropriate in this context. In this paper, we study secure two-party computation with single adaptive corruptions in the non-erasure model where at most one party is adaptively corrupted. To distinguish this notion of single corruptions from fully adaptive security, where both parties may get corrupted, we denote it by one-sided adaptive security. Our goal in this work is to make progress in the study of two-party protocols with one-sided security which is applicable in many scenarios. All the theorems that we prove below do not hold in the fully adaptive setting.
Our Results -One-Sided NCE with Constant Overhead. A non-committing encryption (NCE) scheme [CFGN96] implements secure channels in the presence of adaptive corruptions and is an important building block in designing adaptively secure protocols. In [DN00], Damgård and Nielsen presented a theoretical improvement in the one-sided setting by designing an NCE under strictly weaker assumptions than the assumptions used for fully adaptive NCE thus far. Nevertheless, known one-sided NCE constructions [CFGN96, DN00], and fully adaptive NCE constructions [DN00, CDSMW09a], require O(1) PKE operations for each transmitted bit. It was unknown whether this bound can be reduced for one-sided NCEs and even matched with the overhead of standard PKEs. Informally stated, in this paper we prove that Theorem 1.1 For any q = q(n) polynomial in the security parameter n, there exists a one-sided NCE with constant number of PKE operations for message space {0, 1} q .
We suggest a new approach for designing NCEs secure against one-sided adaptive attacks. Our protocols are built on two cryptographic building blocks that are non-committing with respect to a single party. We denote these by NCE for the sender and NCE for the receiver. Non-committing for the receiver (NCER) implies that one can efficiently generate a secret key that decrypts a simulated ciphertext into any plaintext. Whereas non-committing for the sender (NCES) implies that one can efficiently generate randomness for any plaintext for proving that a ciphertext, encrypted under a fake key, encrypts this plaintext. A core building block in our one-sided construction is (a variant) of the following protocol, in which the receiver generates two sets of public/secret keys; one pair of keys for each public key system, and sends these public keys to the sender. Next, the sender partitions its message into two shares and encrypts the distinct shares under the distinct public keys. Finally, the receiver decrypts the ciphertexts and reconstructs the message. Both NCES and NCER are semantically secure PKEs that as efficient as standard PKEs.
Importantly, the security of this protocol only works if the simulator knows the identity of the corrupted party since fake public keys and ciphertexts cannot be explained as valid ones. We resolve this issue by slightly modifying this protocol using somewhat NCE [GWZ09] in order to encrypt only three bits. Namely, we use somewhat NCE to encrypt the choice of having fake/valid keys and ciphertexts (which only requires a single non-committing bit per choice). This enables the simulator to "explain" fake keys/ciphertext as valid and vice versa using only a constant number of asymmetric operations. In this work we consider two implementations of NCER and NCES. For polynomial-size message spaces the implementations are secure under the DDH assumption, whereas for exponential-size message spaces security holds under the DCR assumption. The NCER implementations are taken from [JL00, CHK05] . NCES was further discussed in [FHKW10] and realized under the DDH assumption in [BHY09] using the closely related notion of lossy encryption. 1 In this paper we realize NCES under the DCR assumption.
Our Results -One-sided Adaptively Secure Oblivious Transfer with Constant Overhead. We use our one-sided NCEs to implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) between a sender and a receiver. We consider a generic framework that abstracts the statically secure OT of [PVW08] that is based on a dualmode PKE primitive, while encrypting only a small portion of the communication using our one-sided NCE. For any sender's input space {0, 1} q our construction requires a constant number of PKE operations. This is significantly better than the fully adaptively secure OT of [GWZ09] (currently the most efficient fully adaptive construction), that requires O(q) PKE operations. We prove that: Theorem 1.2 For any q = q(n) polynomial in the security parameter n, there exists a one-sided OT with constant number of PKE operations for sender's input space {0, 1} q .
We build our UC secure one-sided OT based on the PVW protocol with the following modifications.
(1) First, we require that the sender sends its ciphertexts via a one-sided non-committing channel (based on our previous result, this only inflates the overhead by a constant). (2) We fix the common parameters of the dual-mode PKE in a single mode (instead of alternating between two modes as in the [GWZ09] protocol). To ensure correctness, we employ a special type of ZK PoK which uses a novel technique; see below for more details. Finally, we discuss two instantiations based on the DDH and QR assumptions.
Our Results -Constant Round One-Sided Adaptively Secure Computation. Theoretically, it is well known that any statically secure protocol can be transformed into a one-sided adaptively secure protocol by encrypting the entire communication using NCE. This approach, adopted by [KO04] , implies that the number of PKE operations grows linearly with the circuit size times a computational security parameter. 2 A different approach in the OT-hybrid model was taken in [IPS08] , which does not improve this bound either.
In this work we demonstrate the feasibility of designing generic constant round protocols based on Yao's garbled circuit technique with one-sided security, tolerating semi-honest and malicious attacks. Our main observation implies that one-sided security can be obtained even if only the keys corresponding to the inputs and output wires are communicated via a one-sided adaptively secure channel. This implies that the bulk of communication is transmitted as in the static setting. Using our one-sided secure primitives we obtain protocols that outperform the constant round one-sided constructions of [KO04, IPS08] and all known generic fully adaptively secure two-party protocols. Our proofs take a different simulation approach, circumventing the difficulties arise due to the simulation technique from [LP09] that builds a fake circuit (which cannot be applied in the adaptive setting). Specifically, we prove that Theorem 1.3 There exists a constant round one-sided semi-honest adaptively secure two-party protocol that requires O(|C|) private key operations and O(|input| + |output|) public key operations.
In order to obtain one-sided security against malicious attacks we adapt the cut-and-choose based protocol introduced in [LP12] . The idea of the cut-and-choose technique is to ask one party to send s garbled circuits and later open half of them by the choice of the other party. This ensures that with very high probability the majority of the unopened circuits are valid. Proving security in the one-sided setting requires dealing with new subtleties and requires a modified cut-and-choose OT protocol, since [LP12] defines the public parameters of their cut-and-choose OT protocol in a way that precludes the equivocation of the receiver's input. Our result in the malicious setting follows. Theorem 1.4 There exists a constant round one-sided malicious adaptively secure two-party protocol that requires O(s · |C|) private key operations and O(s · |input| + |output|) public key operations where s is a statistical parameter that determines the cut-and-choose soundness error.
This asymptotic efficiency is significantly better than the efficiency of the prior protocols [KO04, IPS08] .
Additional Result -Witness Equivocal UC ZK PoK for Compound Statements. As a side result, we demonstrate a technique for efficiently generating statically secure UC ZK PoK for known Σ-protocols. Our protocols use a new approach where the prover commits to an additional transcript which enables to extract the witness without rewinding, using constant overhead.
We further focus on compound statements (where the statement is comprised of sub-statements for which the prover only knows a subset of the witnesses), and denote a UC ZK PoK by witness equivocal if the simulator knows the witnesses for all sub-statements but not which subset is given to the real prover. We extend our proofs for this notion to the adaptive setting as well. In particular, the simulator must be able to convince an adaptive adversary that it does not know a different subset of witnesses. This notion is weaker than the typical one-sided security notion (that requires simulation without the knowledge of any witness), but is still meaningful in designing one-sided secure protocols. In this work, we build witness equivocal UC ZK PoKs for a class of fundamental compound Σ-protocols, without relying on NCE. Our protocols are round efficient and achieve a negligible soundness error, and are built based on one-sided secure primitives. Finally, they are proven secure in the UC framework [Can01].
To conclude, our results may imply that one-sided security is strictly easier to achieve than fully adaptive security, and for some applications this is indeed the right notion to consider. We leave open the feasibility of constant round one-sided secure protocols in the multi-party setting. Currently, it is not clear how to extend our techniques beyond the two-party setting (such as within the [BMR90] protocol), and achieve secure constructions with a number of PKE operations that does not depend on the circuit size.
Prior Work
We describe prior work on NCE, adaptively secure OT and two-party computation.
Non-Committing Encryption (NCE). One-sided NCE was introduced in [CFGN96] which demonstrated their feasibility under the RSA assumption. It was further studied in [DN00, CDSMW09a]. The construction of [DN00] requires constant rounds on the average and is based on simulatable PKE, whereas [CDSMW09a] presents an improved expected two rounds NCE based on a weaker primitive.
[DN00] further presented a one-sided NCE based on a weakened simulatable PKE notion. The computational overhead of these constructions is O(1) PKE operations for each transmitted bit. An exception is the somewhat NCE introduced in [GWZ09] (see Appendix D.3 for more details). This primitive enables to send arbitrarily long messages at the cost of log PKE operations, where is the equivocality parameter that determines the number of messages the simulator needs to explain. This construction improves over fully NCEs for sufficiently small 's. Finally, in [Nie02] Nielsen proved that adaptively secure non-interactive encryption scheme must have a decryption key that is at least as long as the transmitted message. [GS12] shows adaptively secure constant round protocols tolerating n − 1 out of n corrupted parties using a non-black box simulation approach. Their approach uses the OT hybrid compiler of [IPS08] . In the erasure model, one of the earliest works by Beaver and Haber [BH92] showed an efficient generic transformation from adaptively secure protocols with ideally secure communication channels, to adaptively secure protocols with standard (authenticated) communication channels. A more recent work by Lindell [Lin09] presents an efficient semi-honest constant round two-party protocol with adaptive security.
Basic Notations
We denote the security parameter by n. A function µ(·) is negligible if for every polynomial p(·) there exists a value N such that for all n > N it holds that µ(n) < 1 p(n) . We denote by a ← A the random sampling of element a from a set A and write PPT for probabilistic polynomial-time. For some polynomial q = q(n), {0, 1} q denotes the message spaces of our non-committing encryption schemes and the message space of the sender in our OT protocols. The rest of the standard notations have been moved to Appendix B.
3 One-sided Adaptively Secure NCE In this section we design one-sided NCE, building on NCE for the sender (NCES) and NCE for the receiver (NCER). Namely, NCER implies that for any plaintext there exists an efficiently generated secret key that decrypts a fake ciphertext into that plaintext (see Definition D.1). Furthermore, NCES implies that for any plaintext there exists efficiently generated randomness for proving that a ciphertext, encrypted under a fake key, encrypts that plaintext (see Definition D.3). We review the formal definitions and two implementations for NCER and NCES in Appendix D.
The idea of our protocol is to have the receiver create two public/secret key pairs where the first pair is for NCES and the second pair is for NCER. The receiver sends the public keys and the sender encrypts two shares of its message m, each share with a different key. Upon receiving the ciphertexts the receiver recovers the message by decrypting the ciphertexts. Therefore, equivocality of the sender's input can be achieved if the public key of the NCES is fake, whereas, equivocality of the receiver's input can be achieved if the ciphertext of the NCER is fake. Nevertheless, this idea only works if the simulator is aware of the identity of the corrupted party prior to the protocol execution in order to decide whether the keys or the ciphertexts should be explained as valid upon corruption (since it cannot explain fake keys/ciphertext as valid). We resolve this problem using somewhat NCE in order to commit to the choice of having fake/valid keys and ciphertexts. Specifically, it enables the simulator to "explain" fake keys/ciphertext as valid and vice versa using only a constant number of asymmetric operations, as each such non-committing bit requires an equivocation space of size 2. (An overview of somewhat NCE is given in Appendix D.3.)
Formally, denote by F SC (m, −) → (−, m) the secure message transfer functionality, and let Π NCES = (Gen, Gen * , Enc, Dec, Equivocate) and Π NCER = (Gen, Enc, Enc * , Dec, Equivocate) denote secure NCES and NCER for a message space {0, 1} q . Consider the following one-sided protocol for F SC .
Protocol 1 (One-sided NCE (Π OSC ))
• Inputs: Sender SEN is given input message m ∈ {0, 1} q . Both parties are given security parameter 1 n .
• The Protocol:
1. Message from the receiver. REC invokes Gen(1 n ) of Π NCES and Π NCER and obtains two public/secret key pairs (PK 0 , SK 0 ) and (PK 1 , SK 1 ), respectively. REC sends PK 1 on clear and PK 0 using somewhat NCE with equivocality parameter = 2.
2.
Message from the sender. Upon receiving PK 0 and PK 1 , SEN creates two shares of m; m 0 and m 1 , such that m = m 0 ⊕ m 1 . It then encrypts each m i using PK i , creating ciphertext c i , and sends c 0 and c 1 using two instances of somewhat NCE with equivocality parameter = 2.
3. Output. Upon receiving c 0 , c 1 , REC decrypts c i using SK i and outputs the bitwise XOR of the decrypted plaintexts.
Note that the message space of our one-sided NCE is equivalent to the message space of the NCES/NCER schemes, where q can be as large as n. Therefore, our protocol transmits q-bits messages using a constant number of PKE operations, as opposed to fully adaptive NCEs that require O(q) such operations. We provide two instantiations for the above protocol. One for polynomial-size message spaces using DDH based NCES and NCER, and another for exponential-size message spaces using DCR based NCES and NCER. We conclude with the following theorem; the complete proof is found in Appendix E.
Theorem 3.1 For any n and q as above, Protocol 1 UC realizes F SC in the presence of one-sided adaptive malicious adversaries for message space {0, 1} q .
Intuitively, security follows due to the fact that the simulator is not committed to either valid keys or valid ciphertexts. Thus, upon corrupting one of the parties it is able to explain that party's internal state, while equivocating the communication and make it consistent with message m. For instance, if the sender is corrupted after simulating its message, the simulator can explain PK 0 as a fake key. Thus, the ciphertext encrypted under this key can be explained with respect to any plaintext.
4 One-Sided Adaptively Secure OT A common approach to design an adaptive OT [Bea98, CLOS02] is by having the receiver generate two public keys (PK 0 , PK 1 ) such that it only knows the secret key associated with PK σ . The sender then encrypts x 0 , x 1 under these respective keys so that the receiver decrypts the σth ciphertext. The security of this protocol in the adaptive setting holds if the underlying encryption scheme is an augmented noncommitting encryption scheme [CLOS02] . In this section we follow the approach from [GWZ09] and build one-sided OT based on the static OT from [PVW08] , which is based on a primitive called dual-mode PKE.
The [PVW08] OT. Dual-mode PKE is a semantically secure encryption scheme that is initialized with system parameters of two types. For each type one can generate two types of public/secret key pair; labeled by the left key pair and the right key pair. Similarly, the encryption algorithm generates a left or a right ciphertext. Moreover, if the key label matches the ciphertext label (i.e., a left ciphertext is generated under the left public key), then the ciphertext can be correctly decrypted. (A formal definition of dual-mode PKE is given in Appendix B.3.) This primitive was introduced in [PVW08] which demonstrated its usefulness in designing efficient statically secure OTs under various assumptions. First, the receiver generates a left key if σ = 0, and a right key otherwise. In response, the sender generates a left ciphertext for x 0 and a right ciphertext for x 1 . The receiver then decrypts the σth ciphertext.
The security of dual-mode PKE relies on the two indistinguishable modes of generating the system parameters: messy and decryption mode. In a messy mode the system parameters are generated together with a messy trapdoor. Using this trapdoor, any public key (even malformed ones) can be labeled as a left or as a right key. Moreover, when the key type does not match the ciphertext type, the ciphertext becomes statistically independent of the plaintext. The messy mode is used to ensure security when the receiver is corrupted since it allows to extract the receiver's input bit while hiding the sender's other input. On the other hand, the system parameters in a decryption mode are generated together with a decryption trapdoor that can be used to decrypt both left and right ciphertexts. Moreover, left public keys are statistically indistinguishable from right keys. The decryption mode is used to ensure security when the sender is corrupted since the decryption trapdoor enables to extract the sender's inputs while statistically hiding the receiver's input. [PVW08] instantiated dual-mode PKE and their generic OT construction based on various assumptions, such as DDH, QR and lattice-based assumptions. We recall the instantiation based on DDH assumption in Appendix F.2.
Our construction. We build our one-sided OT based on the PVW protocol considering the following modifications.
(1) First, we require that the sender sends its ciphertexts using one-sided NCE (see Section 3). (2) We fix the system parameters in a decryption mode, which immediately implies extractability of the sender's input and equivocality of the receiver's input. We further achieve equivocality of the sender's input using our one-sided NCE. In order to ensure extractability of the receiver's input we employ a special type of ZK PoK. Namely, this proof exploits the fact that the simulator knows both witnesses for the proof yet it does not know which witness will be used by the real receiver, since this choice depends on σ. Specifically, it allows the simulator to use both witnesses and later convince the adversary that it indeed used a particular witness. In addition, it enables to extract σ since the real receiver does not know both witnesses. We denote these proofs for compound statements by witness equivocal and refer to Appendix C.2 for more details.
Our construction is one-sided UC secure in the presence of malicious adversaries, and uses a number of non-committed bits that is independent of the sender's input size or the overall communication complexity. We formally denote the dual-mode PKE of [PVW08] by Π DUAL = (SetupMessy, SetupDecryption, dGen, dEnc, dDec, FindBranch, TrapKeyGen) and describe our construction in the (F SC , F R LR ZKPoK )-hybrid model, where F SC is instantiated with one-sided NCE. Furthermore, the later functionality is required to ensure the correctness of the public key and is defined for a compound statement that is comprised from the following two relations,
where CRS are the system parameters. Similarly, we define R RIGHT for the right keys. Specifically, F R LR ZKPoK receives a public key PK and randomness r and returns Accept if either PK = dGen(CRS, 0; r) or PK = dGen(CRS, 1; r). Security is proven by implementing this functionality using a witness equivocal ZK PoK proof that allows the simulator to equivocate the witness during the simulation (i.e., explaining the proof transcript with respect to either r 0 or r 1 ). We consider two instantiations of dual-mode PKE (based on the DDH and QR assumptions). For each implementation we design a concrete ZK PoK, proving that the prover knows r with respect to b ∈ {0, 1}; see more details below.
We define our OT protocol as follows,
• Inputs: Sender SEN has x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} q and receiver REC has σ ∈ {0, 1}.
• CRS: CRS such that (CRS, t) ← SetupDecryption.
1. REC sends SEN PK, where (PK, SK) ← dGen(CRS, σ; r). REC calls F
RLR
ZKPoK with (PK, r).
Upon receiving Accept from F

RLR
ZKPoK and PK, SEN generates c 0 ← dEnc PK (x 0 , 0) and c 1 ← dEnc PK (x 1 , 1). SEN calls F SC twice with inputs c 0 and c 1 , respectively. The complete proof is given in Appendix F.1.
Concrete Instantiations. In the DDH-based instantiation the CRS is a Diffie-Hellman tuple (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) and the trapdoor is log g 0 g 1 . Moreover, the concrete ZK PoK functionality is F R DL,OR ZKPoK which is invoked with the statement and witness ((g 0 h 0 , g r σ h r σ ), (g 1 h 1 , g r σ h r σ )), r , such that PK = (g r σ , h r σ ), SK = r and r ← Z p . (For the DDH based [PVW08] OT, see Appendix F.2.)
In the QR-based instantiation the CRS is a quadratic residue y and the trapdoor is s such that y = s 2 mod N and N is an RSA composite. The concrete ZK PoK functionality is F R QR,OR ZKPoK which is invoked with the statement and witness (y · PK, PK), r , such that PK = r 2 /y σ , SK = r and r ← Z * N .
Constant Round One-Sided Adaptively Secure Computation
In the following section we demonstrate the feasibility of one-sided adaptively secure two-party protocols in the presence of semi-honest and malicious adversaries. Our constructions are constant round and UC secure and use a number of non-committed bits that is independent of the circuit size, thus reduce the number of PKE operations so that it only depends on the input and output lengths.
A High-Level Overview of Yao's Garbling Technique
We briefly describe the garbling technique of Yao as described by Lindell and Pinkas in [LP09] . In this construction, the desired function f is represented by a boolean circuit C that is computed gate by gate from the input wires to the output wires. In the following, we distinguish four different types of wires used in a given boolean circuit: (a) circuit-input wires; (b) circuit-output wires; (c) gate-input wires (that enter some gate g); and (d) gate-output wires (that leave some gate g). The underlying idea is to associate every wire w with two random values, say k 0 w , k 1 w , such that k 0 w represents the bit 0 and k 1 w represents the bit 1. The garbled table for each gate maps random input values to random output values, with the property that given two input values it is only possible to learn the output value that corresponds to the output bit. This is accomplished by viewing the four potential inputs to the gate k 0 1 , k 1 1 (values associated with the first input wire) and k 0 2 , k 1 2 (values associated with the second input wire), as encryption keys. So that the output key values k 0 3 , k 1 3 are encrypted under the appropriate input keys. For instance, let g be a NAND gate. Then, k 1 3 (that corresponds to bit 1) is encrypted under the pair of keys associated with the values (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0). Whereas, k 0 3 is encrypted under the pair of keys associated with (1, 1) which yields the following four ciphertexts
where Enc is a private key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) that has indistinguishable encryptions for multiple messages, and an elusive efficiently verifiable range; see [LP09] for the formal definitions. These ciphertexts are randomly permuted in order to obtain the garbled table for gate g. Then, given the input wire keys k α 1 , k β 2 that correspond to the bits α and β and the garbled table containing the four encryptions, it is possible to obtain the output wire key k
. The description of the garbled circuit is concluded with the output decryption tables, mapping the random values on the circuit output wires back to their corresponding boolean values.
One-Sided Yao for Semi-Honest Adversaries
Our first construction adapts the semi-honest two-party protocol [Yao82, LP09] into the one-sided adaptive setting at a cost of O(|C|) private key operations and O(|input| + |output|) public key operations. Using our one-sided secure primitives we obtain efficient protocols that outperform the constant round one-sided constructions of [KO04, IPS08] and all known fully adaptively secure two-party protocols. Namely, we show that one-sided security can be obtained by only communicating the keys corresponding to the input/output wires via a non-committing channel. This implies that the number of PKE operations does not depend on the garbled circuit size as in prior work.
Informally, the input keys that correspond to P 0 's input are transferred to P 1 using somewhat NCE with equivocation parameter = 2, whereas P 1 's input keys are sent using one-sided OT. Next, the entire garbled circuit (without the output decryption table) is sent to P 1 using a standard communication channel. P 1 evaluates the garbled circuit and finds the keys for the output wires. The parties then run a one-sided bit OT for each output key where P 1 plays the role of the receiver, and learns the output bit that corresponds to its output wire. Finally, P 1 sends P 0 the output using one-sided NCE. We note that obtaining the output via onesided OT is crucial to our proof since it enables us to circumvent the difficulties arise when implementing the simulation technique from [LP09] that uses a fake circuit. To carry out these OTs successfully we require that the keys associated with a output wire have distinct most significant bits that are fixed independently of the bits they correspond to. For simplicity we only consider deterministic and same-output functionalities. This can be further generalized using the reductions specified in [Gol04] . The formal description of our one-sided semi-honest protocol Π SH f is given below in the F OT -hybrid model. • Inputs: P 0 has x 0 ∈ {0, 1} n and P 1 has x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n . Let
n . Furthermore, we assume that C is such that if a circuit-output wire leaves some gate, then the gate has no other wires leading from it into other gates (i.e. no circuit-output wire is also a gate-output wire). Likewise, a circuit-input wire that is also a circuit-output wire enters no gates.
1. Setup and garbling circuit computation. P 0 constructs garbled circuit G(C) as described in Section 5.1 subject to the constraint that the keys corresponding to each circuit-output wire have a distinct most significant bit. 2. Transferring the garbled circuit and input keys to P 1 . Let (k ) be the key pair corresponding to the ith circuit-output wire with distinct most significant bits. Also assume P 1 obtains key k α 2n+i corresponding to the ith circuit-output wire of G(C). Then, (a) For all i ∈ [1, . . . , n], P 0 and P 1 call F OT in which P 0 's input equals (0, 1) if the most significant bit of k 0 2n+i is 0, and (1, 0) otherwise. P 1 's input is the most significant bit of k
by concatenating the bits received from the above n calls.
4. Output communication. P 1 sends y using a one-sided non-committing channel.
Theorem 5.1 (One-sided semi-honest) Let f be a deterministic same-output functionality and assume that the encryption scheme for garbling has indistinguishable encryptions under chosen plaintext attacks, and an elusive and efficiently verifiable range. Furthermore, assume that F OT is realized in the presence of onesided semi-honest adversaries. Then, Protocol 3 UC realizes F f in the presence of one-sided semi-honest adversaries.
The proof is found in Appendix G.1. We note that the ideal OT calls in Step 2 can be realized using string one-sided OTs, whereas the OT calls in Step 3 can be replaced with bit one-sided OTs.
Security against Malicious Adversaries
Next, we modify Π SH f and adapt the cut-and-choose OT protocol introduced in [LP12] in order to achieve security against malicious adversaries. The idea of the cut-and-choose technique is to ask P 0 to send s garbled circuits and later open half of them (aka, check circuits) by the choice of P 1 . This ensures that with very high probability the majority of the unopened circuits (aka, evaluation circuits) are valid. The cut-and-choose OT primitive of [LP12] allows P 1 to choose a secret random subset J of size s/2 for which it learns both keys for each input wire that corresponds to the check circuits, and the keys associated with its input with respect to the evaluation circuits.
In order to enforce P 0 to hand P 1 consistent input keys for all the circuits, the [LP12] protocol ensures that the keys associated with P 0 's input are obtained via a Diffie-Hellman pseudorandom synthesizer [NR95] . Namely, P 0 chooses values g a 0 1 , g a 1 1 , . . . , g a 0 n , g a 1 n and g c 1 , . . . , g cs , where n is the input/output length and s is the cut-and-choose parameter. So that the pair of keys associated with the ith input of P 0 in the jth circuit is (g a 0 i c j , g a 1 i c j ). 4 Given values {g a 0 i , g a 1 i , g c j } and any subset of keys associated with P 0 's input, the remaining keys associated with its input are pseudorandom by the DDH assumption. Furthermore, 4 The actual key pair used in the circuit garbling is derived from (g a 0 i c j , g a 1 i c j ) using an extractor. A universal hash function is used in [LP12] for this purpose, where the seeds for the function are picked by P0 before it knows J . when the keys are prepared this way P 0 can efficiently prove that it used the same input for all circuits. P 1 then evaluates the evaluation circuits and takes the majority value for the final output. In Section 5.3.1 we demonstrate how to adapt the cut-and-choose OT protocol into the one-sided setting using the building blocks introduced in this paper. This requires dealing with new subtleties regarding the system parameters and the ZK proofs. In Appendix G.3 we describe our full construction Π MAL f and prove this theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (One-sided malicious) Let f be a deterministic same-output functionality and assume that the encryption scheme for garbling has indistinguishable encryptions under chosen plaintext attacks, an elusive and efficiently verifiable range. Then, Protocol Π MAL f UC realizes F f in the presence of one-sided malicious adversaries.
Overall, the efficiency of Π MAL f is O(s · |C|) private key operations and O(s · |input| + |output|) public key operations where s is a statistical parameter that determines the cut-and-choose soundness error.
One-sided Single Choice Cut-and-Choose OT
We describe next the single choice cut-and-choose OT functionality F CCOT from [LP12] and present a protocol that implements this functionality with UC one-sided malicious security. In Appendix G.3, we describe how to build a batch single choice cut-and-choose OT using a single choice cut-and-choose OT, which is used as a building block in the main two-party protocol. Formally, F CCOT is described as follows, This functionality is implemented in [LP12] by invoking the DDH based [PVW08] OT s times (for the complete details, see Appendix F.2), where the receiver generates the system parameters in a decryption mode for s/2 indices corresponding to J and the remaining system parameters are generated in a messy mode. The decryption mode trapdoor enables the receiver to learn both sender's inputs for the instances corresponding to J . This idea is coupled with two proofs that are run by the receiver: (i) a ZK PoK for proving that half of the system parameters set is in a messy mode which essentially boils down to a ZK PoK realizing functionality F Our first step towards making the [LP12] construction one-sided adaptively secure is to invoke our one-sided OT scheme s times with all system parameters in a decryption mode. Notably, we cannot use the messy mode for the s/2 instances not in J as in the static settings since that would preclude the equivocation of the receiver's bit. Similarly to [LP12] , our constructions have two phases; a setup phase and a transfer phase. In the setup phase, the receiver generates the system parameters in a decryption mode for the s/2 OTs corresponding to indices in J , while the remaining system parameters are generated in the same mode but in a way that does not allow REC to learn the trapdoor. This is obtained by fixing two random generators g 0 , g 1 , so that the receiver sets the first component of every CRS from the system parameters to be g 0 . Moreover, the second component in positions j ∈ J is a power of g 1 , else this element is a power of g 0 . Note that REC does not know log g 0 g 1 which is the decryption mode trapdoor for j ∈ J . To ensure correctness, REC proves that it knows the discrete logarithm of the second element with respect to g 1 of at least s/2 pairs. This is achieved using a witness equivocal proof for functionality F R DL,COMP(s,s/2) ZKPoK described in Appendix C.2. In the transfer phase, the receiver uses these system parameters to create a public/secret key pair for each OT execution, for keys not in the set J . For the rest of the OT executions the receiver invokes the TrapKeyGen algorithm of the dual-mode PKE and obtains a public key and two secret keys that enable it to decrypt both of the sender's inputs. In order to ensure that the receiver uses the same input bit σ for all OTs the receiver proves its behavior using the proof specified above. Finally, we prove the equivocality of the sender's input and the receiver's output based on one-sided NCE.
Formally, let the DDH based dual-mode PKE of [PVW08] be specified by Π DUAL = (SetupMessy, SetupDecryption, dGen, dEnc, dDec, FindBranch, TrapKeyGen) (cf. Appendix F.2) . We denote our onesided OT by Π CCOT and present it in the (F SC , F • Auxiliary Inputs: Both parties hold a security parameter 1 n and G, p, where G is an efficient representation of a group of order p and p is of length n.
• CRS: The CRS consists of a pair of random group elements g 0 , g 1 from G.
• Setup phase:
1. REC chooses a random x j ∈ Z p and sets g For all j, REC chooses a random y j ∈ Z p and sets
to SEN. Furthermore, for all j ∈ J , REC stores the decryption mode trapdoor t j = x j . , {x j } j∈J ) to prove the knowledge of the discrete logarithms of s/2 values within the second element in {CRS j } j and with respect to g 1 .
REC calls F
• Transfer phase (repeated in parallel for all j):
and stores the secret keys.
) to prove that all the tuples in one of the sets • Output: Upon receiving (c
Theorem 5.3 Assume the DDH assumption holds in G, F SC is implemented using a protocol with onesided security and there exist witness equivocal UC ZK PoKs for F The proof is given in Appendix G.2.
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A Security Definitions
In the following, we formalize the notion of UC one-sided adaptive security [Can01]. Formally, a twoparty computation protocol is cast by specifying the participating parties P 0 and P 1 and a functionality f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where f = (f 0 , f 1 ) mapping pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). That is, for every pair of inputs x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n the output pair is a random variable (f 0 (x 0 , x 1 ), f 1 (x 0 , x 1 )) ranging over pair of strings. The first party with input x 0 wishes to receive f 0 (x 0 , x 1 ), while the second party with input x 1 wishes to obtain f 1 (x 0 , x 1 ).
A.1 One-sided Adaptive Security
We begin by introducing the formal definition of one-sided adaptive security in the UC framework. In the two-party setting, a real execution of some protocol Π f that implements f is run between two parties P 0 and P 1 in the presence of an adversary ADV and an environment ENV (that is given an input z, a random tape r ENV and a security parameter n), and is modeled as a sequence of activations of the entities. ENV is activated first and generates the inputs for the other entities. Then the protocol proceeds by having the parties communicating with each other, and ADV exchanges messages with ENV. Upon completing the real execution ENV outputs a bit. In the ideal model, the computation involves an incorruptible trusted third party F f which receives the parties' inputs, computes the function f on these inputs and returns to each party its respective output. The parties are replaced by dummy parties that do not communicate with each other, such that whenever a dummy party is activated it sends its input to the ideal functionality. Upon completing the ideal execution ENV outputs a bit. We say that a protocol Π f UC realizes functionality F f if for any real world adversary ADV there is a ideal world adversary SIM such that no ENV can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV and the parties running Π f in a real execution or with SIM and the dummy parties in an ideal execution. Details follow.
Execution in the real model. We now proceed with a real world execution, where a real two-party protocol is executed. Whenever ENV is activated it first and fixes input x i ∈ {0, 1} * for party P i . Each party P i then starts the execution with an input x i ∈ {0, 1} * , a random tape r i and a security parameter n. A onesided adversary ADV is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machine that is given a random tape r ADV and a security parameter n. At the outset of the protocol, ADV receives some initial information from ENV. Then the computation proceeds in rounds such that in each round ADV sees all the messages sent between the parties. At the beginning of each round, ADV may choose to corrupt P i * for i * ∈ {0, 1}. Upon corrupting P i * , ADV learns its input and the random tape, and obtains some auxiliary information from ENV. In case ADV is malicious P i * follows ADV's instructions from the time it is corrupted. At the end of the protocol execution the honest parties locally compute their outputs and output the value specified by the protocol, whereas the corrupted party outputs a special symbol ⊥. The adversary ADV outputs an arbitrary function of its internal state that includes, r ADV , the messages received from ENV and the corrupted party's view. Next, a post-execution corruption process begins. Namely, ENV first learns the outputs. Then, ADV and ENV interact in at most one additional round. If none of the parties is corrupted yet, ENV can ask ADV to corrupt P i * for i * ∈ {0, 1}, receiving back the state of this party. At the end ENV outputs a bit.
Let f be as specified above and Π f be a two-party protocol that computes f . We denote by the variable OREAL Π f ,ADV,ENV (n, x 0 , x 1 , z, r) the output of ENV on input z, random tape r ENV and a security parameter n upon interacting with ADV and parties P 0 , P 1 that engage in protocol Π f on inputs r ADV and (x 0 , r 0 ), (x 1 , r 1 ), respectively, where r = (r ENV , r ADV , r 0 , r 1 ). Let OREAL Π f ,ADV,ENV (n, x 0 , x 1 , z) denote a random variable describing OREAL Π f ,ADV,ENV (n, x 0 , x 1 , z, r) where the random tapes are chosen uniformly. Let OREAL Π f ,ADV,ENV denote the distribution ensemble:
Execution in the ideal model. A one-sided ideal world adversary SIM is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machine that is given a random tape r SIM and a security parameter n. The ideal process is defined with respect to a trusted party that implements functionality F f as follows:
First corruption phase: SIM receives some auxiliary information from ENV. Next, SIM may decide whether to corrupt party P i * for i * ∈ {0, 1}. Upon corrupting party P i * , SIM learns its input x i * . In addition, ENV hands some auxiliary information to SIM.
Computation phase: In the semi-honest setting, each party forwards its input to the trusted party. In the malicious settings, the corrupted party hands F f the values handed to it by SIM. The trusted party computes (y 0 , y 1 ) = f (x 0 , x 1 ) and hands each P i the value y i . SIM receives the output of the corrupted party.
Second corruption phase: SIM continues to another corruption phase, where it might choose to corrupt P i * for i * ∈ {0, 1} (in case it did not corrupt any party in the first corruption phase), where this choice is made based on SIM's random tape and all the information gathered so far. Upon corrupting P i * , SIM learns its input x i * . ENV hands SIM some auxiliary information.
Output: The uncorrupted party P 1−i * outputs y 1−i * and the corrupted party outputs ⊥. SIM outputs an arbitrary efficient function of its view. ENV learns all the outputs.
Post-execution corruption phase: After the outputs are generated, SIM proceeds with ENV in at most one round of interaction, where ENV can instruct SIM to corrupt P i * for i * ∈ {0, 1} (if none of the parties are corrupted yet). SIM generates some arbitrary answer and might choose to corrupt P i * . The interaction continues until ENV halts with an output.
We denote by OIDEAL F f ,SIM,ENV (n, x 0 , x 1 , z, r) the output of ENV on input z, random tape r ENV and security parameter n upon interacting with SIM and parties P 0 , P 1 , running an ideal process with inputs r SIM and x 0 , x 1 , respectively, where r = (r ENV , r SIM ). Let OIDEAL F f ,SIM,ENV (n, x 0 , x 1 , z) denote a random variable describing OIDEAL F f ,SIM,ENV (n, x 0 , x 1 , z, r) when the random tapes r ENV and r ADV are chosen uniformly. Let OIDEAL F f ,SIM,ENV denote the distribution ensemble:
Then we define security as follows.
Definition A.1 Let F f and Π f be as defined above. Protocol Π f UC realizes F f in the presence of onesided semi-honest/malicious adversaries if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time one-sided semi-honest/malicious adversary ADV, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time ideal adversary SIM such that:
where |x 0 | = |x 1 |.
Composition. In order to simplify our security proofs we consider the hybrid setting where the parties implement some functionalities using ideals calls. We rely on the composition theorem by Canetti [Can01] in the adaptive setting. (We do note that we are only interested in cases where the same party is corrupted with respect to all composed protocols.)
A.2 Concrete Functionalities
We specify the definition of three important functionalities for this work.
Secure communication (SC).
We define the functionality F SC (m, −) → (−, m) for securely communicating a message m from P 0 to P 1 .
Oblivious transfer (OT). The 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer functionality is defined by F OT ((x 0 , x 1 ), σ)) → (−, x σ ). In a bit OT x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1}, whereas in a string OT x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n .
Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK PoK). Let N P relation R associated with the language L R = {x| ∃w s.t. (x, w) ∈ R}. Then, we define the ZK PoK functionality for R by
B Basic Notations
We specify the definition of computational indistinguishability.
Definition B.1 (Computational indistinguishability by circuits) Let X = {X n (a)} n∈IN,a∈{0,1} * and Y = {Y n (a)} n∈IN,a∈{0,1} * be distribution ensembles. We say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ c Y , if for every family {C n } n∈IN of polynomial-size circuites, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all a ∈ {0, 1} * ,
B.1 Public Key Encryption Schemes
We specify the definitions of public key encryption and semantic security.
Definition B.2 (PKE)
We say that Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a public-key encryption scheme if Gen, Enc, Dec are polynomial-time algorithms specified as follows:
• Gen, given a security parameter n (in unary), outputs keys (PK, SK), where PK is a public key and SK is a secret key. We denote this by (PK, SK) ← Gen(1 n ).
• Enc, given the public key PK and a plaintext message m, outputs a ciphertext c encrypting m. We denote this by c ← Enc PK (m); and when emphasizing the randomness r used for encryption, we denote this by c ← Enc PK (m; r).
• Dec, given the public key PK, secret key SK and a ciphertext c, outputs a plaintext message m s.t. there exists randomness r for which c = Enc PK (m; r) (or ⊥ if no such message exists). We denote this by m ← Dec PK,SK (c).
For a public key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) and a non-uniform adversary ADV = (ADV 1 , ADV 2 ), we consider the following Semantic security game:
b ← ADV 2 (c, history).
Denote by Adv Π,ADV (n) the probability that ADV wins the semantic security game.
Definition B.3 (PKE semantic security) A public key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is semantically secure, if for every non-uniform adversary ADV = (ADV 1 , ADV 2 ) there exists a negligible function negl such that Adv Π,ADV (n) ≤ 1 2 + negl(n).
B.2 Simulatable Public Key Encryption
A simulatable public key encryption scheme is a semantically secure PKE with four additional algorithms.
I.e., an oblivious public key generator Gen and a corresponding key faking algorithm Gen . Intuitively, the key faking algorithm is used to explain a legitimately generated public key as an obliviously generated public key. Similarly, the ciphertext faking algorithm is used to explain a legitimately generated ciphertext as an obliviously generated one. ) and has the following three properties,
• Semantic Security. (Gen, Enc, Dec) is semantically secure as in Definition B.3.
• Oblivious public key generation. Consider the experiment (PK, SK) ← Gen(1 n ), r ← Gen −1 (PK) and PK ← Gen(r ). Then, (r, PK) c ≡ (r , PK ).
• Oblivious ciphertext generation. For any message m in the appropriate domain, consider the
The El Gamal PKE [Gam85] is one example for simulatable PKE.
B.3 Dual-Mode PKE
A dual-mode PKE Π DUAL is specified by the algorithms (Setup, dGen, dEnc, dDec, FindBranch, TrapKeyGen) described below.
• Setup is the algorithm for generating system parameters. Given a security parameter n and a mode µ ∈ {0, 1}, the algorithm outputs (CRS, t). The CRS is a common string for the remaining algorithms, and t is a trapdoor value that enables either the FindBranch or TrapKeyGen algorithm depending on the mode. The setup algorithm for messy and decryption mode are distinguished as SetupMessy and SetupDecryption; namely SetupMessy := Setup(1 n , 0) and SetupDecryption := Setup(1 n , 1).
• dGen is the key generation algorithm that takes a bit α and the CRS as input. If α = 0, then it generates left public and secret key pair. Otherwise, it creates right public and secret key pair.
• dEnc is the encryption algorithm that takes a bit β, a public key PK and a message m as input. If β = 0, then it creates the left encryption of m, else it creates the right encryption.
• dDec decrypts a message given a ciphertext and a secret key SK.
• FindBranch(t, PK) finds whether a given public key (in messy mode) is left key or right key given the messy mode trapdoor t.
• TrapKeyGen(t) generates a public key and two secret keys using the decryption mode trapdoor t such that both left encryption as well as the right encryption using the public key can be decrypted using the secret keys.
Definition B.5 (Dual-mode PKE) A dual-mode PKE is a tuple of algorithms described above that satisfy the following properties:
1. Completeness. For every mode µ ∈ {0, 1}, every (CRS, t) ← Setup(1 n , µ), every α ∈ {0, 1}, every (PK, SK) ← dGen(α), and every m ∈ {0, 1} , decryption is correct when the public key type matches the encryption type, i.e., dDec SK (dEnc PK (m, α)) = m.
2. Indistinguishability of modes. The CRS generated by SetupMessy and SetupDecryption are computationally indistinguishable, i.e., SetupMessy(1 n ) c ≡ SetupDecryption(1 n ).
(Messy mode) Trapdoor extraction of Key Type.
For every (CRS, t) ← SetupMessy(1 n ) and every (possibly malformed) PK, FindBranch(t, PK) outputs the public key type α ∈ {0, 1}. Encryption at branch 1 − α is then message-lossy; namely, for every m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} , dEnc PK (m 0 , 1 − α)
(Decryption mode) Trapdoor generation of keys decryptable on both branches. For every (CRS, t) ←
SetupDecryption(1 n ), TrapKeyGen(t) outputs (PK, SK 0 , SK 1 ) such that for every α, (PK, SK α ) c ≡ dGen(α).
B.4 Hardness Assumptions
Our constructions rely on the following hardness assumptions.
Definition B.6 (DDH)
We say that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard relative to G = {G n } if for all polynomial-sized circuits C = {C n } there exists a negligible function negl such that
where q is the order of G and the probabilities are taken over the choices of g and x, y, z ∈ Z q .
We require the DDH assumption to hold for prime order groups.
Definition B.7 (DCR)
We say that the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problem is hard if for all polynomial-sized circuits C = {C n } there exists a negligible function negl such that
where N is a random n-bit RSA composite, r is chosen at random in Z N , and the probabilities are taken over the choices of N, y and r.
Definition B.8 (QR)
We say that the Quadratic Residuosity (QR) problem is hard if for all polynomial-sized circuits C = {C n } there exists a negligible function negl such that
where N is a random n-bit RSA composite, J N denote the group of Jacobi symbol (+1) elements of Z * N , QR N = {x 2 : x ∈ Z * N } denote J N 's subgroup of quadratic residues and the probabilities are taken over the choices of N, z.
C Efficient Statically Secure and Witness Equivocal UC ZK PoKs
We present two results in this section. First, we show a technique for generating efficient statically secure UC ZK PoK for various Σ-protocols. Our protocols take a new approach where the prover commits to an additional transcript which, in turn, enables witness extraction without rewinding. Our instantiations imply UC ZK PoK constructions that incur constant overhead and achieve negligible soundness error, and thus they are of independent interest.
We next show how to generate efficient witness equivocal UC ZK PoK for various compound Σ-protocols. The additional feature that witness equivocal UC ZK PoK offers over statically secure UC ZK PoK is that it allows the simulator to equivocate the simulated proof upon corruption with respect to the real witness. Interestingly, we build witness equivocal UC ZK PoKs for a class of fundamental compound Σ-protocols without relying on NCE at all. Our approach yields witness equivocal UC ZK PoK only for compound statements where the simulator knows the witnesses for all sub-statements (but not the real witness). This notion is weaker than the stronger notion of one-sided UC ZK PoK where the simulator is required to simulate the proof obliviously of the witness, and later prove consistency with respect to the real witness. Our protocols are round efficient with constant overhead and ensure a negligible soundness error.
We briefly describe our technique for generating efficient UC ZK PoK for Σ-protocols. Recall that in order to obtain a UC secure ZK PoK for a Σ-protocol it suffices to build a straight line simulator and witness extractor in the CRS model. A straight line simulator can be obtained by using standard techniques of committing the challenge of the verifier at the onset of the proof using UC commitments [DN02] . In what follows, we will focus on designing straight line extractors. We begin with a generalization of our UC ZK PoKs for Σ-protocols for relations of the form R Γ = ((G,H, y), x)| y = Γ(x) defined with respect to a one-way homomorphic mapping Γ :G →H from a source group (G, ⊕) to a target group (H, ). (Where Γ is homomorphic if Γ(x 0 ⊕ x 1 ) = Γ(x 0 ) Γ(x 1 )). 5 Loosely speaking, given a Σ-protocol Π Γ for R Γ we modify Π Γ by instructing the prover to send two responses z, z to a pair of distinct challenges c, c queried by the verifier. The former message z is sent on clear and publicly verified as specified in Π Γ , whereas the later message z is encrypted using a homomorphic PKE with plaintext spaceG. Moreover, the validity of z is carried out by a UC ZK proof of consistency. Clearly, the efficiency of the new proof depends heavily on the overhead of this ZK proof. Observe also that an extractor can be easily constructed for this proof by placing a public key for the homomorphic PKE in the CRS, of which the extractor knows the corresponding secret key. Our technique also generalizes to compound statements proof technique [CDS94].
C.1 Efficient Statically Secure UC ZK PoK for Σ-Protocols
DL-Based UC Secure ZK PoK. We continue with illustrating our technique on the Σ-protocol for proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm in a prime order group G. We instantiate (G, ⊕) with (Z p , +) for operation + denoting addition in Z p , and (H, ) with (G, ·) for operation · denoting multiplication in G. Furthermore, the one-way group homomorphism is defined by Γ(x) = DL(x) = g x where g is a generator of G which induces the relation
We first apply our technique on the Σ-protocol due to [Sch89] and instantiate the homomorphic PKE with the additively homomorphic PKE of Paillier [Pai99] defined by Enc(x; r) = (1 + N ) x · r N mod N 2 where N is an RSA composite. Formally,
Protocol 5 (UC ZK PoK of DL (Π DL ))
• CRS: A public key PK for Paillier PKE.
• Joint statement: The description of a group G of prime order p and a generator g, and the public statement h.
• Auxiliary input for the prover: x ∈ Z p such that h = g x .
1. Prover P picks a random r ← Z p and sends the verifier a = g r .
2. Verifier V returns random challenges c, c ← Z p .
3. P sends z ← r + cx mod p and encrypts z ← r + c x mod p using PK, generating ciphertext e. P sends z and e to V and proves in UC ZK that the plaintext of e and the discrete log of ah c are the same.
V accepts if the ZK proof is verified correctly and g
The proof used in Step 3 is obtained from a Σ-protocol for the following relation
Namely, the goal is to prove consistency of discrete logarithms with respect to two different group orders with generators (1 + N ) and g, respectively. This can be achieved by combining the proof of knowledge of discrete logarithms over the integers [DJN10] and the proof of plaintext knowledge for Pailler (we note that [DJN10] shows a proof for consistent exponents, i.e., for DH tuples, but the same proof technique works here as well). Namely, the prover selects at random y and β, computes e = (1 + N ) y β N mod N 2 and h = g y and sends e , h to the verifier, who returns a random challenge c ∈ Z p . The prover then replies with z = y + cx (over integers) and γ = αβ c mod N . However, to ensure the privacy of x within y + cx, y must be chosen so that its length is at least |c| + |x| + κ, where κ is a statistical parameter. The verifier then accepts if (1 + N ) z γ N mod N 2 = e e c mod N 2 and g z = h h c . We further note that the above proof requires a special care since it must ensure that the exact same value x is encrypted under Paillier rather than x + ip, for p the order of G and i some integer. Nevertheless, an extractor that decrypts and learns x + ip can still find x. Thus our extractor first learns z by decrypting the Paillier ciphertext and then extracts x from z and z . Finally, the above Σ-protocol and the PoK presented in Protocol 5 are in the UC framework by using standard techniques of committing the challenge of the verifier at the beginning of the proof using UC commitment scheme [GK96] . We denote the UC ZK PoK for R DL as Π DL .
Proposition C.1 Assume the DCR and DDH assumptions hold. Then, Protocol 5 UC realizes F R DL ZKPoK .
Informally, the proof follows by having the extractor pick a pair of keys (PK, SK) and place PK in the CRS. Then, whenever receiving ciphertext e from the prover, the extractor decrypts it using SK and extracts the witness from z and z . Consistency of Discrete Logarithms. Next, we consider a UC PoK for the following relation
Here (G, ⊕) is instantiated with (Z p , +) and (H, ) with (G × G, ·). We further define by Γ(x) = (g x 0 , g x 1 ) where g 0 , g 1 are two generators in G. As above, we use Paillier PKE to encrypt the second reply of the prover. The proof is an immediate extension of the Protocol 5 and the standard Σ-protocol for R DDH . The underlying ZK proof for proving the correctness of the plaintext encrypted by the prover is an extension of the proof for relation used in Protocol 5 and can be obtained in a similar manner. Specifically, the relation for the underlying ZK proof is:
. UC PoKs for N th Root and Quadratic Residuosity. The proof we consider here is a proof of knowledge of an N th root formally defined by,
We instantiate (G, ⊕) with (Z * N , ·) and (H, ) with (Z * N 2 , ·), where multiplication is computed in the respective group. Furthermore, Γ(x) = x N mod N 2 . Note that in order to encrypt the message of the prover we need to use a multiplicative PKE, and we therefore consider a variant of El Gamal PKE that operates in Z * N for a message space QR N . Specifically, encrypting a message m ∈ QR N is computed by (e 1 , e 2 ) = (g r mod N, m · h r mod N ) where g is a random generator in QR N , h = g x mod N with a secret key x ∈ Z φ(N )/4 and randomness r ∈ Z φ(N )/4 . The security of this scheme is based on the composite DDH assumption [DJ03] in Z * N (defined below). In the proof below, the verifier is required to ensure that z N = au 2c . This is achieved by raising the ciphertext e = (e 1 , e 2 ) encrypting z to the power of N component-wise modulo N 2 , and then have the prover prove that e N 1 , e N 2 /au 2c is a Diffie-Hellman tuple in Z * N 2 . Such a ZK proof is provided in [DJN10]. Namely, to ensure that z is in QR N we use 2c instead of c . The Composite DDH Assumption. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus and g is an element of QR N the group of squares in Z * N . Then values a and b are chosen uniformly at random in Z φ(N )/4 and the value y is either random in QR N or satisfies y = g ab mod N . Finally, the assumption asserts that for any polynomial-time algorithm, the advantage in guessing which way y was sampled when given (N, g, g a mod N, g b mod N, y) is negligibly close to 1/2.
Protocol 6 (UC ZK PoK for R NR (Π NR ))
• Auxiliary input for the prover:
• CRS: A composite N and a public key PK = (G, h = g x ) for El Gamal PKE in Z * N .
1. Prover P picks a random r ← Z * N and sends verifier V the value a where a = r N mod N 2 where r ← r 2 mod N .
2. V returns random challenges c, c ← Z * N . 3. P sets z ← rv c mod N and z ← rv 2c mod N , and encrypts z using PK (note that z ∈ QR N ). Denote the generated ciphertext by e = (e 1 , e 2 ). P sends V values z and e and proves in UC ZK that the decryption of e N mod N 2 corresponds to au 2c mod N 2 . That is, P proves that (Z * N 2 , g, h, e Finally, we consider a proof of knowledge of a square root that is formally defined by,
We instantiate (G, ⊕) with (Z * N , ·) and (H, ) with (QR N , ·), where multiplication is computed in the respective groups. Furthermore, Γ(x) = x 2 mod N . Following a similar technique used for the ZK PoK of R NR we design a proof for F 
C.2 Efficient Witness Equivocal UC ZK PoK for Compound Statements
The above proof technique is not applicable in the adaptive setting since it does not allow equivocation. Fortunately, in this work we only need to consider compound statements for which the simulator knows all witnesses but does not know which one to use during the simulation, since this choice depends on the input of the real prover. In compound statements for Σ-protocols the prover separates the challenge c that is given by the verifier into two values; c 1 and c 2 such that c = c 1 ⊕ c 2 . Assume w.l.o.g. that the prover does not have a witness for the first statement, then it always chooses c 1 in which it knows how to complete the proof (similarly to what the simulator does), and uses its witness for the other statement to complete the second proof on a given challenge c 2 . Note that the verifier cannot distinguish whether the prover knows the first or the second witness (or both); see [CDS94] for more details.
Nevertheless, allowing the simulator to use all potential witnesses in the adaptive setting is not equivocal, since an adversary that corrupts the prover can detect a simulated execution by simply computing multiple witnesses when given the prover's internal state. In order to resolve this difficulty we instruct the prover to obliviously sample the ciphertexts for the statements it does not know the witness for, i.e., sampling a ciphertext without knowing the corresponding plaintext. This property holds with respect to both homomorphic PKEs used in our proofs in order to encrypt the response for the second challenge.
This type of compound statements generalizes to s sub-statements for which the prover proves the knowledge of witnesses of some subset. For this general case, [CDS94] suggest to split the challenge using a perfect secret sharing scheme, e.g. Shamir's secret sharing scheme. First, the sub-statements are divided into two sets such that the prover knows the witnesses for the statements in set J , but not the witnesses for the sub-statements inJ . The prover then creates challenges c i for the sub-statements inJ . Finally, the set {c j } j∈J and the verifier's challenge c are interpreted as |J | shares and the secret in a secret sharing scheme with s participants and a threshold |J | + 1. Thus, the values c and {c j } j∈J completely define all the s shares. In the special case where s = 2 the prover runs the honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator for the sub-statements inJ using challenges {c j } j∈J . For the sub-statements in J it defines the challenges as defined by the shares {c j } j∈J for the secret c and generates a response using its witnesses. The prover also sends the s shares of c to the verifier who checks that indeed the shares define c with threshold |J | + 1. We conclude with the following theorem.
Theorem C.1 Assume the existence of homomorphic PKE with respect to a group H and operation , that supports oblivious and invertible sampling of ciphertexts. Then, for every Σ-protocol designed for a compound statement as above and one-way group homomorphism Γ :G →H, there exists a witness equivocal UC ZK PoK that introduces a negligible soundness error and constant overhead.
We use the notation of Π Γ,OR for denoting the compound extended proof of Π Γ where both statements are proven in R Γ and F R Γ,OR ZKPoK to denote the ideal functionality for Π Γ,OR . We consider a proof Π DDH,OR(s) where the statement is a combination of two sub-statements, each sub-statement contains s tuples. That is, the statement is a proof of knowledge of which one of the two sets is DH tuples. Finally, we consider a proof Π Γ,COMP(s,t) where the statement consists of s sub-statements of R Γ and the prover proves the knowledge of t sub-statements out of s (for some t < s).
D Non-Committing Encryptions (NCE) -A Review of the Different Notions D.1 NCE for the Receiver
An NCE for the receiver is a semantically secure PKE with an additional property that enables generating a secret key that decrypts a simulated (i.e., fake) ciphertext into any plaintext. Specifically, the scheme operates in two modes. The "real mode" enables to encrypt and decrypt as in the standard definition of PKE (see Definition B.2). The "simulated mode" enables to generate simulated ciphertexts that are computationally indistinguishable from real ciphertexts. Moreover, using a special trapdoor information one can produce a secret key that decrypts a fake ciphertext into any plaintext. Intuitively, this implies that the simulated ciphertexts are generated in a lossy mode where the plaintext is no longer well defined given the ciphertext and the public key. This leaves enough entropy for the secret key to be sampled in a way that determines the desired plaintext. We continue with a formal definition of NCE for the receiver.
Definition D.1 (NCE for the receiver (NCER)) We say that Π NCER = (Gen, Enc, Enc * , Dec, Equivocate) is a NCE for the receiver if Gen, Enc, Enc * , Dec, Equivocate are polynomial-time algorithms specified as follows:
-Gen, Enc, Dec are as specified in Definition B.2.
-Enc * , given the public key PK output a ciphertext c * and a trapdoor t c * .
-Equivocate, given the secret key SK, trapdoor t c * and a plaintext m, output SK * such that m ← Dec SK * (c * ).
• (Gen, Enc, Dec) is semantically secure as in Definition B.3.
• The following ciphertext indistinguishability holds for any plaintext m: (PK, SK * , c * , m) and (PK, SK, c, m) are computationally indistinguishable, for (PK, SK) ← Gen(1 n ), (c * , t c * ) ← Enc * (PK), SK * ← Equivocate(SK, c * , t c * , m) and c ← Enc PK (m).
We now review two implementations of NCER under the DDH and DCR assumptions.
NCER under the DDH assumption for polynomial-size message spaces. NCER for polynomial message space can be constructed under the DDH assumption [JL00, CHK05]. For simplicity we consider a binary plaintext space. Let (g 0 , g 0 , p) ← G(1 n ) be an algorithm that given a security parameter n, returns a group G = G g 0 ,g 1 ,p specified by its generators g 0 , g 1 and its order p. Then define Π DDH NCER = (Gen, Enc, Enc * , Dec, Equivocate) as follows.
-Gen, given the security parameter n, set (g 0 , g 1 , p) ← G(1 n ). Choose uniformly random x, y ← Z 2 p and compute h = g x 0 g y 1 . Output the secret key SK = (x, y) and the public key PK = (g 0 , g 1 , h).
-Enc, given the public key PK and a plaintext m ∈ G, choose a uniformly random r ← Z * p . Output the ciphertext (g r 0 , g r 1 , m · h r ).
-Enc * , given the public key PK choose uniformly random r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ← Z * p . Output the fake ciphertext (g
) and trapdoor t c * = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ).
-Dec, given the secret key (x, y) and a ciphertext (c 0 , c 1 , Φ) , output Φ · (c x 0 c y 1 ) −1 .
-Equivocate, given (x, y), a simulated ciphertext c * , trapdoor t c * = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) and a plaintext m ∈ G output SK * = (x * , y * ) by solving the system of linear equations induced by the exponents of the public key and ciphertext c * = (g It is easy to verify that real and simulated ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable under the DDH assumption since the only difference is with respect to the first two group elements; the third group element induces a linear combination of the first two elements and the secret key in the exponent.
NCER under the DCR assumption for exponential-size message spaces. NCER for exponential message space can be constructed under the DCR assumption [CHK05]. Let (p , q ) ← G(1 n ) be an algorithm that given a security parameter n returns two random n bit primes p and q such that p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 are also primes. Let N = pq and N = p q . Define Π DCR NCER = (Gen, Enc, Enc * , Dec, Equivocate) as follows.
-Gen, given the security parameter n, run (p , q ) ← G(1 n ) and set p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, N = pq and N = p q . Choose random x 0 , x 1 ← Z N 2 /4 and a random g ∈ Z * N 2 and compute g 0 = g 2N , h 0 = g x 0 and h 1 = g x 1 0 . Output public key PK = (N, g 0 , h 0 , h 1 ) and secret key SK = (x 0 , x 1 ).
-Enc, given the public key PK and a plaintext m ∈ Z N , choose a uniformly random t ← Z N/4 and output ciphertext
-Enc * , given the public key PK choose uniformly random t ← Z φ(N )/4 , compute the fake ciphertext
-Dec, given the secret key (x 0 , x 1 ) and a ciphertext (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ), check whether c
-Equivocate, given N , (x 0 , x 1 ), a ciphertext (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) and a plaintext m ∈ Z N , output SK * = (x * 0 , x 1 ), where x * 0 ← Z N N is the unique solution to the equations x * 0 = x mod N and x * 0 = x 0 − m mod N . These equations have a unique solution due to the fact that gcd(N, N ) = 1 and the solution can be obtained employing Chinese Remainder Theorem.
It can be verified that the secret key SK * matches the public key PK and also decrypts the 'simulated' ciphertext to the required message m. The first and third component of PK remains the same since
Using the fact that the order of (1 + N ) in Z * N 2 is N , we have
Assuming the hardness of the DCR assumption, then Π DCR NCR is a secure NCER.
It is easy to verify that real and simulated ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable under the DCR assumption since the only difference is with respect to the first element (which is an 2N th power in real ciphertext and not an 2N th power in simulated ciphertext); the other two elements are powers of the first element. Furthermore SK = (x 0 , x 1 ) and SK * = (x * 0 , x 1 ) are statistically close since x 0 ← Z N 2 /4 and x * 0 ← Z N N and the uniform distribution over Z N N and Z N 2 /4 is statistically close.
D.2 NCE for the Sender
NCE for the sender is a semantically secure PKE with an additional property that enables generating a fake public key, such that any ciphertext encrypted under this key can be viewed as the encryption of any message together with the matched randomness. Specifically, the scheme operates in two modes. The "real mode" that enables to encrypt and decrypt as in standard PKEs and the "simulated mode" that enables to generate simulated public keys and an additional trapdoor, such that the keys in the two modes are computationally indistinguishable. In addition, given this trapdoor and a ciphertext generated using the simulated public key, one can produce randomness that is consistent with any plaintext. We continue with a formal definition of NCE for the sender.
Definition D.3 (NCE for the sender (NCES))
We say that Π NCR = (Gen, Gen * , Enc, Dec, Equivocate) is an NCE for the sender if Gen, Gen * , Enc, Dec, Equivocate are polynomial-time algorithms specified as follows:
-Gen * generates public key PK * and a trapdoor t PK * .
-Equivocate, given a ciphertext c * computed using PK * , a trapdoor t PK * and a plaintext m, output r such that c * ← Enc(m, r).
• The following public key indistinguishability holds for any plaintext m: (PK * , r * , m, c * ) and (PK, r, m, c) are computationally indistinguishable, for (PK * , t PK * ) ← Gen * (1 n ), c * ← Enc PK * (m , r ), r * ← Equivocate(c * , t PK * , m) and c ← Enc PK (m, r).
We first review the DDH based implementation from [BHY09] and then present our DCR based implementation.
NCES under the DDH assumption for polynomial-size message spaces. We begin with our new NCE for the sender based on the DDH assumption. For simplicity we consider a binary plaintext space. Let (g, h, p) ← G(1 n ) be an algorithm that given a security parameter n returns a group G = G g 0 ,g 1 ,p specified by its generators g 0 , g 1 and its order p. Then define Π DDH NCES = (Gen, Gen * , Enc, Dec, Equivocate) as follows.
-Gen, given the security parameter n, set (g 0 , g 1 , p) ← G(1 n ). Choose uniformly random x ← Z p and compute h i = g x i for all i ∈ {0, 1}. Output the secret key SK = x and the public key PK = (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ).
-Gen * , given the security parameter n, set (g 0 , g 1 , p) ← G(1 n ). Choose uniformly random x 0 , x 1 ← Z 2 p and h i = g
i for all i ∈ {0, 1}. Output the trapdoor t PK * = (x 0 , x 1 ) and the public key PK * = (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ).
-Enc, given the public key PK (or PK * ) and a plaintext m ∈ G, choose a uniformly random
-Dec, given the secret key x and a ciphertext (g c , h c ), output h c · (g x c ) −1 .
-Equivocate, given the fake key PK * = (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ), trapdoor t PK * , a ciphertext c * = Enc PK * (m; (s , t )) and a plaintext m, output (s, t) such that c * ← Enc(m; (s, t)) by solving the system of linear equations induced by the exponents of the two elements in ciphertext. 7 Lemma D.3 Assuming the hardness of the DDH assumption, Π DDH NCES is a secure NCES.
Proof: It is easy to verify that real and simulated public keys are computationally indistinguishable under the DDH assumption even in the presence of the randomness of the encryption. Proving indistinguishability of a real and simulated public key in the presence of the randomness used for encryption is sufficient since a ciphertext is a linear combination of the public key using the randomness for encryption both in the real as well as in the simulated world. The proof follows by a reduction to the DDH assumption as follows. Given a tuple (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) adversary ADV DDH that attempts to decide whether the give tuple is a DH tuple or not, fixes this tuple as the public key, encrypts a message m under this key and output the public key, ciphertext, m and the randomness it used to generate the ciphertext. It then invokes the adversary ADV DDH NCES for our scheme that can tell apart (with non-negligible probability) a simulated public key from a valid public key. ADV DDH outputs what ADV DDH NCES outputs. Clearly, ADV DDH can decide if a given tuple is a DH tuple.
NCES under the DCR assumption for exponential-size message spaces. In what follows, we introduce a new NCE for the sender based on the security of the DCR assumption. This allows us to fix the composite as part of the CRS when appropriate. Our scheme is based on the PKE from [CHK05], building on earlier work by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] . Let N = pq be an RSA modulus, then define Π DCR NCES = (Gen, Gen * , Enc, Dec, Equivocate) a NCES as follows.
-Gen, given the security parameter n, generate an RSA modulus N = pq with p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 where p, q, p , q are primes. Pick g ← Z * N 2 and α ← Z N 2 /4 and set g 0 = g 2N mod N 2 and h 0 = g α 0 mod N 2 . Choose a random r ← Z N/4 and compute g 1 = g r 0 mod N 2 , h 1 = ((1 + N ) · h r 0 ) mod N 2 . Output PK = (N, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 ) and secret key SK = α.
-Gen * , given the security parameter n, generate N, g 0 , h 0 as in Gen. Choose a random r ← Z N/4 and compute g 1 = g r 0 mod N 2 , h 1 = h r 0 mod N 2 . Output PK * = (N, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 ) and trapdoor t PK * = r.
-Enc, given the public key PK = (N, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 ) (or PK * ) and a message m ∈ Z N , choose a random t ← Z N/4 and output the ciphertext
-Dec, given the public key PK = (N, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 ), secret key SK = α and ciphertext c = (g c , h c ), computem as follows and output m ∈ Z N such thatm = 1 + mN .
, the fake key PK * = (N, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 ), trapdoor t PK * = r, a ciphertext c * ← Enc PK * (m; t) = (g c , h c ) and a message m , output t = (rm + t − rm ) mod Φ(N )/4. It is easy to see that
Next, we show that this scheme meets Definitions D.4.
Lemma D.4 Assuming the hardness of the DCR assumption, Π DCR NCES is a secure NCES. Proof: Given the public key PK = (N, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 ) and two messages m, m ∈ Z N , we show that encryptions of m and m are computationally close. Namely tuples, (1) The fact that fake and valid public keys are computationally indistinguishable follows from the semantic security of [CHK05] and [CS02] and the former proof (for the DDH based scheme). As the former key is an encryption of zero whereas the later key is an encryption of one.
D.3 Somewhat Non-Committing Encryption [GWZ09]
The idea of somewhat NCE is to exploit the fact that it is often unnecessary for the simulator to explain a fake ciphertext for any plaintext. Instead, in many scenarios it suffices to explain a fake ciphertext with respect to a small set of size known in advance (where might be as small as 2). Therefore two parameters are considered here: a plaintext of bit length l and an equivocality parameter which is the number of plaintexts that the simulator needs to explain a ciphertext for (namely, the non-committed domain size). Note that for fully NCE = 2 l . Somewhat NCE improves over fully NCE whenever is very small but the plaintext length is still large, say O(n) for n the security parameter.
[GWZ09] design somewhat NCE uses three primitives: simulatable PKE (cf. Definition B.2), NCE (for the purpose of sending a short index of length log ), and a secret key encryption (SKE). Let (Gen, Enc, Dec, Gen, Gen ) be a simulatable PKE and (Gen SKE , Enc SKE , Dec SKE ) be an SKE in which the ciphertexts are indistinguishable from uniformly random values of the same length. Then somewhat NCE execution between a sender SEN (given a message m) and a receiver REC is carried out as follows:
Setup Phase.
• SEN sends a random index i ∈ [ ] using NCE.
• SEN generates public keys. For j ∈ {1, . . . , } \ {i}, the keys PK j ← Gen(1 n ) are generated obliviously while (PK i , SK i ) ← Gen(1 n ). SEN sends the keys PK 1 , . . . , PK and stores SK i .
• REC generates K ← Gen SKE (1 n ) and computes c i ← Enc PKi (K). REC also generates c j ← Enc PKi (1 n ) obliviously for j ∈ {1, . . . , } \ {i}. Finally it sends the ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c .
• SEN decrypts the key K ← Dec SKi (c i ). Both parties store K, i.
Transfer Phase.
• SEN computes C i ← Enc SKE K (m) and chooses C j for j ∈ {1, . . . , } \ {i} uniformly at random of the appropriate length. S sends (C 1 , . . . , C ).
• REC ignores everything other than C i and decrypts m ← Dec
In case of no corruptions, the simulator simulates both parties as follows: it first generates the keys and the ciphertexts in the setup phase using Gen and Enc, and generates keys for a symmetric key encryption. In the transfer phase the simulator uses these symmetric keys to encrypt all plaintexts. Assume that the adversary corrupts a party at the end of this phase then the simulator obtains the message m, say the kth element in [ ]. It first explains k as the message sent using NCE and then uses the key faking and ciphertext faking algorithms to explain every pair of public key/ciphertext other than the kth pair, as obliviously generated (for the simulatable PKE). Given that the kth simulatable PKE ciphertext encrypts the secret key K, then the kth SKE ciphertext encrypts the message m. This simulation strategy works for corruption at any point of the execution.
E NCE Proof: Proof of Theorem 3.1 Proof: Let ADV be a malicious probabilistic polynomial-time adversary attacking Protocol 1 by adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality F SC such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality F SC and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with F SC and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. We explain the strategy of the simulation for all corruption cases.
Simulating the communication with ENV. Every input value received by the simulator from ENV is written on ADV's input tape. Likewise, every output value written by ADV on its output tape is copied to the simulator's output tape (to be read by its environment ENV).
SEN is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the honest receiver by sending to ADV, PK 0 using the somewhat NCE and PK 1 in clear. Upon receiving two ciphertexts c 0 and c 1 from ADV, SIM extracts m by computing Dec SK 0 (c 0 ) ⊕ Dec SK 1 (c 1 ). SIM externally forwards m to the ideal functionality F SC .
REC is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and obtains REC's output m from F SC . SIM invokes ADV and receives PK 0 from ADV via the somewhat NCE and PK 1 in clear. Next, SIM completes the execution playing the role of the honest sender on input m. Note that it does not make a difference whether REC generates invalid public keys since SIM knows m and thus perfectly emulates the receiver's view.
If none of the parties is corrupted as above, SIM emulates the receiver's message as follows. It creates a valid public/secret key pair (PK 1 , SK 1 ) for Π NCER and sends the public key in clear. It then creates a valid public/secret key pair (PK 0 , SK 0 ) and a fake public key with a trapdoor (PK * 0 , t PK * 0 ) for Π NCES (using Gen and Gen * , respectively). SIM sends (PK 0 , PK * 0 ) as the real receiver would do.
SEN is corrupted after
Step 1 is concluded. Since no message was sent yet on behalf of the sender, SIM completes the simulation playing the role of the honest sender using m.
REC is corrupted after
Step 1 is concluded. Upon receiving m, SIM explains the receiver's internal state which is independent of the message m so far. Specifically, it reveals the randomness for generating PK 0 , SK 0 and PK 1 , SK 1 and presents the randomness for PK 0 being the message sent by the somewhat NCE. SIM plays the role of the honest sender with input m as the message.
If none of the above corruption cases occur, SIM emulates the sender's message as follows. It first chooses two random shares m 0 , m 1 and generates a pair of ciphertexts (c 0 , c * 0 ) for Π NCES that encrypts m 0 using PK 0 and PK * 0 . It then generates a pair of ciphertexts (c 1 , c * 1 ) for Π NCER such that c 1 is a valid encryption of m 1 using the public key PK 1 , and c * 1 is a fake ciphertext (generated using Enc * ). SIM sends (c 0 , c * 0 ) and (c * 1 , c 1 ) via two instances of somewhat NCE.
SEN is corrupted after
Step 2 is concluded. Upon receiving a corruption instruction from ENV, SIM corrupts the ideal SEN and obtains SEN's input m. It then explains the sender's internal state as follows. It explains PK * 0 for being the public key sent by the receiver using the somewhat NCE. Furthermore, it presents the randomness for c * 0 and c 1 being the ciphertexts sent via the somewhat NCE. Finally, it computes r ← Equivocate PK * 0 (t PK * 0 , m 0 , r, m 0 ) for m 0 such that m = m 0 ⊕ m 1 and r the randomness used to encrypt m 0 , and presents r as the randomness used to generate c * 0 that encrypts m 0 . The randomness used for generating c 1 is revealed honestly.
REC is corrupted after
Step 2 is concluded. Upon receiving a corruption instruction from ENV, SIM corrupts the ideal REC and obtains REC's output m. It then explains the receiver's internal state as follows. It presents the randomness for PK 0 for being the public key sent via the somewhat NCE and presents the randomness for generating (PK 0 , SK 0 ). It then explains c 0 and c * 1 for being sent via the somewhat NCE. Finally, it generates a secret key SK * 1 so that m 1 ← Dec SK * 1 (c * 1 ) and m 1 ⊕ m 0 = m. That is, it explains (PK 1 , SK * 1 ) as the other pair of keys generated by the receiver.
We now show that for every corruption case described above, there is not any polynomial-time ENV that distinguishes with a non-negligible probability the real execution with ADV and the simulated execution with SIM. SEN/REC is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. There is no difference between the real execution and the simulated execution and the views are statistically indistinguishable.
SEN/REC is corrupted after Step 1. In this case, the only different between the real and simulated executions is with respect to the somewhat NCE that delivers the public key of NCES. Specifically, in the real execution it always delivers a valid public key while in the simulated execution it may be equivocated to a fake key. Indistinguishability follows from the security of the somewhat NCE.
SEN/REC is corrupted after
Step 2 is concluded. Here the adversary sees in the simulation either a fake public key or a fake ciphertext. Indistinguishability follows from the security of Π NCES and Π NCER . Proof Sketch: Let ADV be a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious adversary attacking Protocol2 by adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality F OT such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality F OT and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with F OT and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. Upon computing (CRS, t) ← SetupDecryption(1 n ), SIM proceeds as follows:
SEN is corrupted at the outset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the receiver by running (PK, SK 0 , SK 1 ) ← TrapKeyGen(t). It then sends PK and an Accept message to ADV on behalf of F R LR ZKPoK . Whenever ADV returns c 0 , c 1 via F SC , SIM extracts SEN's inputs x 0 , x 1 by invoking dDec SK 0 (c 0 ) and dDec SK 1 (c 1 ) as in static case. It then sends x 0 , x 1 to F OT and completes the execution playing the role of the receiver using an arbitrary σ.
In contrast to the hybrid execution where the receiver uses its real input σ to dGen to create public/secret keys pair, the simulator does not know σ and thus creates the keys using TrapKeyGen. Nevertheless, when the CRS is set in a decryption mode the left public key is statistically indistinguishable from right public key. Furthermore, the keys (PK, SK i ) that are generated by TrapKeyGen are statistically close to the keys generated by dGen with input bit i. This implies that the hybrid and simulated executions are statistically close.
REC is corrupted at the outset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and receives its public key PK and a witness r on behalf of F R LR ZKPoK . Given r, SIM checks if PK is the left or the right key and use it to extract the receiver's input σ. It then sends σ to F OT , receiving back x σ . Finally, SIM computes the sender's message using x σ and an arbitrary x 1−σ .
Unlike in the hybrid execution, the simulator uses an arbitrary x 1−σ instead of the real x 1−σ . However, a decryption mode implies computational privacy of x 1−σ . Therefore, the hybrid view is also computationally indistinguishable from the simulated view.
If none of the above corruption cases occur SIM invokes (PK, SK 0 , SK 1 ) ← TrapKeyGen(t) and then sends the sender PK. Note that the simulator knows a witness r 0 such that PK = dGen(CRS, 0; r 0 ) and a witness r 1 such that PK = dGen(CRS, 1; r 1 ).
SEN is corrupted between Steps 1 and 2. SIM trivially explains the the sender's internal state since SEN did not compute any message so far. The simulator completes the simulation by playing the role of REC using arbitrary σ as in the case when the sender is corrupted at the outset of the execution.
Indistinguishability for this case follows similarly to the prior corruption case when SEN is corrupted at the outset of the execution.
REC is corrupted between Steps 1 and 2. Upon corrupting the receiver SIM obtains σ, x σ from F OT and explains the receiver's internal state as follows. It first explains r σ as the witness given to F R LR ZKPoK and PK as the outcome of dGen(CRS, σ; r σ ). The simulator completes the simulation playing the role of the honest sender with x σ and an arbitrary x 1−σ .
Indistinguishability for this case follows similarly to the prior corruption case (and from the witness equivocality of the implementation of F R LR ZKPoK in the real setting).
If none of the above corruption cases occur then SIM chooses two arbitrary inputs x 0 , x 1 for the sender and encrypts them using the dual-mode encryption. Denote these ciphertexts by c 0 , c 1 . SIM pretends sending these ciphertexts using F SC .
SEN is corrupted after
Step 2. Upon corrupting the sender SIM obtains (x 0 , x 1 ) from F OT . It then explains the sender's internal state as follows. It first computes c 0 , c 1 that encrypts x 0 and x 1 respectively. SIM then explains c 0 and c 1 as being sent using F SC .
Indistinguishability here follows from the prior corruption case of the sender.
REC is corrupted after
Step 2. Upon corrupting the receiver SIM obtains REC's input and output (σ, x σ ) from F OT . It then explains the receiver's internal state as follows. It first explains r σ as the witness given to F R LR ZKPoK and PK as the outcome of dGen(CRS, σ; r σ ). Finally, it explains the output of F SC as c σ so that c σ is indeed a valid encryption of x σ . Indistinguishability here follows from the security of the prior corruption case of the receiver.
F.2 A Review of DDH-Based OT [PVW08]
In this section we recall the DDH-based PVW OT construction [PVW08] . We begin with their DDH-based dual-mode PKE Π DUAL that is specified by the algorithms (SetupMessy, SetupDecryption, dGen, dEnc, dDec, FindBranch, TrapKeyGen) described below.
• SetupMessy and SetupDecryption are the two algorithms for generating system parameters in messy and decryption mode respectively. Both starts by choosing G = G g,p specified by a generator g and its prime order p.
SetupMessy(1 n ): Choose (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) such that g 0 , g 1 are random generators in G and h i = g
for y 0 , y 1 ∈ Z p . The CRS is (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) and the decryption trapdoor t is (y 0 , y 1 ).
SetupDecryption(1 n ): Choose (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) such that g 0 is a random generator in G and g 1 = g x 0 for x ∈ Z p and h i = g y i for y ∈ Z p . The CRS is (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) and the decryption trapdoor t is x.
dGen(α):
Choose r ← Z p . Let g = g r α and h = h r α , then PK = (g, h) and SK = r.
• dEnc is the encryption algorithm that takes a bit β, a public key PK = (g, h) and a message m as input. If β = 0, the it creates the left encryption of m, else it creates the right encryption. Given β, it chooses u, v and computes the ciphertext as c ← (
• dDec decrypts a message given a ciphertext and a secret key SK. Given c = (c 0 , c 1 ), it outputs c 1 /(c 0 ) SK .
• FindBranch(t, PK) finds whether a given public key (in messy mode) is left key or right key given the messy mode trapdoor t = (y 0 , y 1 ) such that y 0 = y 1 . Given a public key PK = (g, h) created when the CRS is in messy mode, the algorithm says PK is a left key if h = g y 0 and right key otherwise.
• TrapKeyGen(t) generates a public key and two secret keys using the decryption mode trapdoor t such that both left encryption as well as the right encryption using the public key can be decrypted using the secret keys. Given decryption mode trapdoor t, it picks a random t ∈ Z p and computes PK = (g r 0 , h r 0 ) and outputs PK, r, r/t. 4. Output Communication. SIM sends P 1 the string 0 n using a one-sided NCE channel.
Corruption at the outset of the protocol execution.
• P 0 is corrupted. SIM receives P 0 's input x 0 and its output y. It then plays the role of P 1 as in the no corruptions case except that in the final step SIM simulates P 1 sending y via a one-sided NCE channel.
• P 1 is corrupted. SIM receives P 1 's input x 1 and its output y. It then plays the role of P 0 as in the no corruptions case except that in the output computation phase, SIM simulates P 0 sending input (y i , y i ) via the ith call of F OT . This ensures that ADV outputs y irrespective of the keys it inputs.
Corruption between Steps 2 and 3.
• P 0 is corrupted. The simulator simulates P 0 and P 1 as in Steps 1 and 2 of the no corruptions case. Upon corrupting P 0 the simulator receives P 0 's input x 0 and its output y. It then explains the internal state of P 0 until
Step 2 as follows. The setup and the garbling circuit construction are trivially explained. Moreover, P 0 's input to F OT calls for the key transfer are explained as in the simulation of no corruption. Finally, P 0 's input to the ith invocation of the somewhat NCE is explained as k
0 is the ith bit of x i . SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P 1 as in the no corruptions casexcept that in the final step it simulates P 1 sending y via the one-sided NCE.
• P 1 is corrupted. SIM simulates P 0 and P 1 as in the no corruptions case in Steps 1 and 2. Upon corrupting P 1 the simulator receives P 1 's input x 1 and its output y. It then explains the internal state of P 1 as follows. P 1 's input and output pair for the ith F OT key transfer call are explained as
Moreover, P 0 's input to the somewhat NCE channel is explained as k 0 i . SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P 0 as in the no corruptions case, except that in the output computation phase it simulates P 0 sending input (y i , y i ) to the ith call of F OT .
Corruption between Steps 3 and 4.
• P 0 is corrupted. The simulator simulates P 0 and P 1 as in Steps 1, 2 and 3 of the no corruptions case.
Upon corrupting P 0 the simulator receives P 0 's input x 0 and its output y. It then explains the internal state of P 0 as follows. The consistency check up to Step 2 is as in the previous corruption case for P 0 . In Step 3, P 0 's input to F OT for the output computation phase is explained as in the simulation for the no corruptions case. SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P 1 as in the no corruptions case, except that in the final step SIM simulates P 1 sending input y via a one-sided NCE channel. This ensures that ADV receives y as the circuit output.
• P 1 is corrupted. The simulator simulates P 0 and P 1 as in the Steps 1, 2 and 3 of the no corruptions case. Upon corrupting P 1 the simulator receives P 1 's input x 1 and its output y. It then explains the internal state of P 1 as follows. The consistency check up to
Step 2 is as in the previous corruption case for P 1 . In Step 3, P 1 's input and output pair for the ith F OT call in the output computation phase is explained as b, y i , where b is the most significant bit of the key that is associated with the ith output wire. SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P 0 as in the no corruptions case.
Corruption at the end.
• P 1 is corrupted. Upon corrupting P 1 the simulator receives P 1 's input x 1 and its output y. It then explains the internal state of P 1 as follows. The consistency check up to Step 3 is as in the previous corruption case for P 1 . In Step 4, it explains P 1 's input to the somewhat NCE channel as y.
This completes the description of all corruption cases. Note that the only differences between the simulation and the hybrid executions is with respect to the information sent via the somewhat and one-sided NCE channels. These however are computationally indistinguishable due to the semantic security of the encryption schemes.
G.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3 (One-Sided Cut-and-Choose OT)
Proof: Let ADV be a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious adversary attacking Protocol 4 by that adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality of a single choice cut-and-choose oblivious transfer F CCOT such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with the ideal functionality F CCOT and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. We now explain the actions of the simulator for all corruption cases. SIM begins by creating a CRS (g 0 , g 1 ) and storing x = log g 0 g 1 . It then proceeds as follows:
The sender is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the receiver as follows. In the setup phase it picks s system parameters in a decryption mode in which it knows their trapdoors. Namely for each j = 1, . . . , s, it creates CRS j = (g 0 , g
) y j for random x j 's and y j 's, and records the trapdoor t j = x j . The simulator further computes x j = log g 1 g j 1 for all j using the knowledge of x = log g 0 g 1 . It then chooses an arbitrary set J of size s/2 and sends Accept to ADV on behalf of . Note that the simulator knows discrete log for each pair of (g 1 , g j 1 ) in the statement. SIM also emulates REC by sending the adversary the system parameters.
In the transfer phase the simulator invokes TrapKeyGen for all j = 1, . . . , s and computes (PK j , SK 0 j , SK 1 j ) = ((g j , h j ), r j , r j /t j ) ← TrapKeyGen(CRS j , t j ) for j = 1, . . . , s, and sends the public keys to SEN. It further sends Accept to ADV on behalf of F Note that the adversary's views differ only with respect to the ZK statements. Nevertheless, in a decryption mode the receiver's bit is perfectly hidden as well as the subset picked by the receiver. Now, since the proofs are run via ideal calls the simulated and hybrid views are statistically close.
The receiver is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the sender by receiving the witnesses on the behalf of the ZK PoK functionalities in the setup and transfer phases. It extracts J and σ and sends them to F CCOT , receiving back (x j 0 , x j 1 ) for j ∈ J and x j σ for j ∈ J . SIM chooses an arbitrary x j 1−σ for all j ∈ J and emulates the role of SEN using inputs (x j 0 , x j 1 ) for all j = 1, . . . , s. The difference between the simulated and hybrid views is with respect to keys x j 1−σ for all j ∈ J for which the simulator uses arbitrary values. Security is implied by the dual-mode privacy when a left ciphertext is computed with a right key (or vice versa).
If none of the parties gets corrupted at the onset of the protocol execution SIM plays the role of the receiver in the setup phase using an arbitrary subset J for the receiver. Note that SIM knows all the witnesses for the proof in the setup phase (i.e., the discrete logarithms of {g j 1 } s j=1 with respect to g 1 for all s values). It can thus equivocate the proof with respect to the real set J . SIM further plays the role of the receiver in the transfer phase using an arbitrary σ for the receiver. Specifically the simulator simulates the receiver by invoking TrapKeyGen for all j = 1, . . . , s, computing (PK j , SK and {(g j 1 , h j 1 , g j , h j )} s j=1 , which equal {r j } s j=1 for the first set and {r j /t j } s j=1 for the second set.
The sender is corrupted between Steps 2 and 3. Upon corrupting SEN, SIM explains the internal state of the sender by honestly presenting the randomness used so far on the sender's behalf. Finally, SIM completes the execution in the transfer phase by playing the role of the receiver using an arbitrarily chosen σ . Security in this case follows using the same argument as in the previous corruption case.
The receiver is corrupted between Steps 2 and 3. Upon corrupting REC, SIM receives J and σ from The sender is corrupted after simulating the Sender's message in the data transfer phase. Upon corrupting SEN, SIM receives (x j 0 , x j 1 ) for j = 1, . . . , s from F CCOT . It then explains the internal state of SEN by explaining the inputs to F SC as the encryptions for the real inputs. Security follows from the fact that the receiver's input is statistically hidden given the public keys.
The receiver is corrupted after simulating the Sender's message in the data transfer phase. Upon corrupting REC, SIM receives J , σ, {x 
G.3 Malicious One-Sided Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation
First, we remark that the single choice cut-and-choose protocol is executed for every input bit of P 1 in the main two-party computation protocol, but with respect to the same set J . In order to ensure that the same J is indeed used the parties engage in a batch single choice cut-and-choose OT where a single setup phase is run first, followed by n parallel invocations of the transfer phase. We note that CRS and the set J are fixed in the setup phase and remain the same for all n parallel invocations of the transfer phase. We denote the batch functionality by F BATCH CCOT and the protocol by Π BATCH CCOT . We are now ready to describe the steps of our generic protocol Π MAL f computing any functionality f on inputs x 0 and x 1 . We continue with a high-level overview of [LP12] .
Step 1. P 0 constructs s copies of Yao's garbled circuit for computing the function f . All wires keys are picked at random. Keys that are associated with P 0 's input wires are picked as follows. P 0 picks n pairs of random values ((a 0 1 , a 1 1 ), . . . , (a 0 n , a 1 n )) and (c 1 , . . . , c s ) and sets the keys associated with the ith input wire of the jth circuit as the pair (g a 0 i c j , g a 1 i c j ). These values constitute commitments to all 2ns keys of P 0 . 8 This set of keys forms a pseudorandom synthesizer [NR95] , implying that if some subset of the keys is revealed then the remaining keys are still pseudorandom. We also require that each pair of keys that is associated with a circuit output wire differs within the most significant bit.
Step 2. The parties call F
BATCH CCOT
where P 0 inputs the key pairs associated with P 1 's input and P 1 inputs its input x 1 and a random subset J ⊂ [s] of size s/2. P 1 receives from F BATCH CCOT the keys that are associated with its input wires for the s/2 circuits indexed by J (denoted the check circuits). In addition, it receives the keys corresponding to its input for the remaining circuits (denoted the evaluation circuits).
Step 3. P 0 sends P 1 s copies of the garbled circuit (except for the output tables) and the values ((g a 0 1 , g a 1 1 ), . . . , (g a 0 n , g a 1 n ), (g c 1 , . . . , g cs )) which are the commitments to the input keys on the wires associated with P 0 's input. At this point P 0 is committed to all the keys associated with the s circuits.
Step 4. P 1 reveals J and proves that it used this subset in the cut-and-choose OT protocol by sending the keys that are associated with P 1 's first input bit in each check circuit. Note that P 1 knows the keys corresponding to both bits only for the check circuits.
Step 5. In order to let P 1 know the keys for the input wires of P 0 within the check circuits, P 0 sends c j for j ∈ J . P 1 computes the key pair (g a 0 i c j , g a 1 i c j ).
Step 6. P 1 verifies the validity of the check circuits using all the keys associated with their input wires. This ensures that the evaluation circuits are correct with high probability.
Step 7. In order to complete the evaluation phase P 1 is given the keys for the input wires of P 0 . P 0 must be forced to give the keys that are associated with the same input for all circuits. Specifically, the following code is executed for all input bits of P 0 :
1. For every evaluation circuit C j , P 0 sends y i,j = g a x i 0 i c j using a somewhat NCE channel with = 2, where x i 0 is the ith input bit of P 0 . 2. P 0 then proves that a x i 0 i is in common for all keys associated with the ith input bit, which is reduced to showing that either the set {(g, g a is comprised of DH tuples. Notably, it is sufficient to use a single UC ZK proof for the simpler relation R DDH,OR since the above statement can be compressed into a compound statement of two DH tuples as follows: P 0 first chooses s random values γ 1 , . . . , γ s ∈ Z p and sends them to P 1 . Both parties computeg = s j=1 (g c j ) γ j ,ỹ = s j=1 (y i,j ) γ j , of which P 0 proves that either (g, g a x i 0 i ,g,ỹ) or (g, g a 1−x i 0 i ,g,ỹ) is a DH tuple.
Step 8. Upon receiving Accept from F R DDH,OR ZKPoK , P 1 completes the evaluation of the circuits. Namely, for every i ∈ [1, . . . , ns] P 0 and P 1 call F OT in which P 0 's input equals (0, 1) if the most significant bit of the output wire key is associated with 0, and (1, 0) otherwise. Moreover, P 1 's input is the most significant bit of its output key. P 1 concatenates the bits obtained from these OTs and sets the majority of these values as the output y.
Step 9. P 1 sends y using a one-sided NCE channel.
To ensure one-sided security of Π Step 7.2 using a static ZK such that the prover sends the third message of the proof using a somewhat NCE channel with = 2. We note that a statically secure proof is sufficient here since both the statement and the third message of the proof can be equivocated. (3) In Step 8 the F OT calls are realized using one-sided bit OT.
